Kani’s Death and the Political Dilemma

Mohammad-Reza Kani died hours ago. He was the most important and the longest running traditional cleric in the Islamic republic of Iran. He was the most important member of the Revolutionary Council, the first clerical cabinet minister, the interim prime minister after the deaths of Rajai and Bahonar, the president of the most important clerical association in the country (Jame’ Rohaniyate Mobarez - the Combatant Clergy Association), a continuous member of key state assemblies and the head of the fourth Assembly of Experts on Leadership. And even though his presence was viewed to be central among hardline principlists, he had succeeded in recent years to be the moderate pivot among the political forces inside the regime.

Kani was elected to lead the Experts Assembly during the most sensitive point in the conflict between the two main factions of the Iranian state, i.e., between ayatollah Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani, as a way to avert a direct confrontation between the two key clerical groups. When pro-Ahmadinejad hardliners and principlists decided to remove Rafsanjani from the Experts Assembly after they had isolated him, Rafsanjani had to participate in the Assembly’s elections that elect its chairman. But this act would have been the start of his confrontation with the supreme leader and would immediately result in his final removal from power. Rafsanjani withdrew from the race and this way opened the door for Kani to fill it, consequently denying the chairmanship to the opposing faction. The placement of Kani, a neutral cleric, between Hashemi and Khamenei for all practical purposes put off the clash between the two titans.

Now one can understand Ahmad Janati’s words of concern two weeks ago when he said, “The elections in the Experts Assembly are more important than the elections for the Majlis.” With the passing of Kani, the two main political factions inside the regime - the hardliners inside the Steadfast Front who want to install Mesbah Yazdi to head the Experts Assembly as a way alter the balance of power in their own favor and the moderate and reformist camp, along with the important moderate principlists who want Rafsanjani to head the Assembly – will now most certainly clash. The most important element in this is the position of the third group which does not desire Yazdi to attain power but which is also fearful of strengthening Rafsanjani’s position. This faction, which is lead by Janati, does not want either of these two clerics to have more power even though it does not itself have a powerful and popular candidate among traditional clerics to take the helm of the Experts Assembly.

But the Assembly must elect a leader. In 2008 Kani, who led the assembly after Montazeri, Meshkini and Rafsanjani, was encouraged to run for the seat by none other than Rafsanjani, but he declined and so Rafsanjani won it by receiving 51 votes out of 79. Today, while someone like Hashemi Shahrudi can lead the Assembly is trusted by all factions, but his placement there will tilt the balance of power in favor of Rafsanjani. He is also perhaps the only person who can fulfill all the wishes of the hardline principlists. But the Islamic republic does not want to engage in an uncertain election for the Assembly. If Janati loses the race to Rafsanjani, the latter’s influence will clearly increase and if Khamenei intervenes in the race, then an important group within traditional clerics will distance itself from the supreme leader.

So the fragile balance that Kani’s presence created for years between Hashemi, Mesbah, Janati and their forces is on the verge of cracking. And this change is coming at probably the most sensitive point in the regime’s history. Executive power continues to be in the hands of the camp that is Rafsanjani’s which in fact holds the life of the Islamic republic from economic and international perspectives and is dependent on his remaining in power along with Rouhani. On the other hand, the ascent of power of these two if Rafsanjani becomes the head of the Assembly would start a domino effect on the balance of power in the Assembly and the Majlis in 2015.

No matter what direction the current political balance changes to, next year will undoubtedly not look like today.