What is the Use of These Few Armed Men?

Salahedin Khadiv is a Kurdish political analyst and activist from the town of Mahabad. He spoke with Rooz  about the recent agreement signed between the Kurdish Democratic Party and Komeleh in recent weeks. “People’s priorities these days are mostly over economic issues and how to meet their daily needs while political issues are less important,” he said.

The agreement signed between the two major Kurdish groups in the Sanjagh region of Iraqi Kurdistan is an effort for a united approach in confronting the current political issues facing Iran and the region and has been dubbed as an “alliance.” It was signed on August 22 by Abdullah Mohtadi and Mostafa Hajri, the leaders of the two parties.

The announcement of the agreement resulted in waves of support for and opposition to it. Some Iranian activists accused both parties of being separatists and working to break up the country. Others welcomed it and argued that it was a step towards greater unity among Kurdish groups and people.

Salahedin Khadiv takes a different view. Read on for the interview.

Rooz: For over a decade almost all Kurdish groups and parties have been talking about the need for a united front. Can the agreement signed a few weeks ago between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Komeleh be viewed as a step in that direction?

Khadiv: The ten years ago that you mention are a period when Kurdish political groups that were active outside the country faced unprecedented stagnation. Inside Iran, the debate over reforms was at its height and Kurds generally were in support of it. The political field, particularly the opposition also was also part of the Hezbe Kargaran Kordestan dialog which was striving to create a kind of Kurdish International. Under these conditions, the traditional Kurdish groups such as the KDP and the Komeleh however were engaged with their own internal issues and crises. The KDP had been weakened because of the assassination of its leaders and suspension of its military activities.  The Komeleh had more serious problems. The efforts to create a communist party were not only unsuccessful but had resulted in almost complete isolation of the Komeleh in the 90s. In that atmosphere, a faction of the Komeleh split up from the communists and created the Komeleh Party of Iranian Kurdistan. It supported the view of a federal Iran and the creation of a united front comprising various Kurdish groups. But that goal emerged as a response to those specific conditions.

New groups and factions require legitimacy, and these declared goals, while copies of the experience of the Iraqi Kurdistan, were defined to gain legitimacy among people and to create a strategic balance with the KDP, which at the time was the strongest voice of Kurdish people’s quest for recognition and which enjoyed a clearer nationalistic record than Komeleh.

But while these goals were initially raised for specific political purposes and were mere tactics, they did eventually become the popular and widespread calls of the public debate. And while the slogan of the united Kurdistan never materialized, it begs the question why has this unity not materialized till today?

 

In my writings I divide the Iranian Kurdish groups into two: one, those that are supported by the local government – i.e., the two main Kurdish parties – and second, the Kurdish Workers Party. The parties in these groups follow the model of the Kurdish parties in Turkey or Iraq. Whether these models are accurate or whether it is even possible to model them are issued beyond the scope of this interview. But my point is that the split within the communist party of Iran that took place was a turning point which may be viewed as the beginning of modeling of Iraqi Kurdistan and efforts, and thus institutionalizing their tensions and values.

Take a look at the term Kurdistan Front (Jebhe Kordestani); this is taken from the political literature of Iraqi Kurdistan. In 1987 when the Islamic republic of Iran came to a strategic dead end in the southern fronts of the Iran-Iraq war, it decided to activate the front in northern Iraq. To accomplish this, it needed the support of Iraqi Kurds.  But the animosity between the two main and other smaller parties was obstacles to this goal. So by pressuring them and holding a conference in Tehran, it succeeded to temporarily contain the difference among the groups inside the united Kurdish front.

If you take a look at the situation in 2000, none of those elements existed any longer. There were no active Kurdish groups and there was no foreign power interested in supporting them. The formulas that were presented for the creation of this front varied widely. Komeleh insisted on creating a front with itself and the KDP at its center, while the KDP was not willing to play the lesser role in a new grouping.

Later, as more groups broke away from the Komeleh and the KDP, the issue of creating a united front became even more complex and further from being materialized.

Today, while a part of this idea has materialized through the recent arrangement, the formation of this unity can be attributed to issues such as the developments in the Syrian Kurdistan – where the pro-PKK parties has emerged as the dominant group as supporters of the Iraqi Kurdish authority have been pushed to the sidelines – and the pressures applied to the splintered groups.

I believe that this new grouping and alliance will be a trading card in the political games, both among parties that engage in dialogue – i.e., the splintered groups – and also among groups that stay outside the Iraqi dialogue such as PJAK or the Islamic Kurdish groups of Iran.

Rooz: There are many points that you raise. But generally, you believe that the announced goal of “creating a united Kurdish front” is merely a tool to gain legitimacy for the two parties?

Khadiv: It is not only I who says this. The history of the past 10 years shows this. In politics, if we looked only at what politicians said, we would never get to serious analysis and understanding of issues. A lot has been said about the united Kurdistan in recent years and Dr Sama Shali’s remarks about the issues behind the scenes speak of many realities. But why is the issue debated so much? It is to gain legitimacy and possibly attain hegemony. But why did it not materialize? Because the two elements that existed in the issues of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1987 are absent today.

Rooz: But it appears that these two groups have attained this goal of unity by creating the Kurdistan Front, which goes against your argument.

 

Khadiv: If only these two groups existed in the Kurdish scene, then you would be right. But one important faction inside the KDP and two or three factions inside Komeleh have remained outside this new alliance. PJAK too is outside. This new situation may result in other new coalitions. Don’t forget that some of the groups inside the current alliance physically fought each other until a few years ago. It should also be noted that a key complaint of Iranian activists over this new alliance is the tone and language of the agreement which primarily addresses Kurdish audiences and particularly the opposing parties.

Rooz: The leaders of both of these parties say that the alliance has been met with support from the Kurdish people. You are a resident of Iran so the question is what has been the position of the people on this?

Khadiv: This requires more field research. But one cannot deny the fact that generally people rejoice at such efforts. Still, one should not fall into the trap of facades and what the virtual groups advocate or claim. People’s priorities under these circumstances are mostly economic and those related to their daily needs rather than political issues which play a less important role.

Rooz: The signatories of the alliance claim that aside the virtual support, they have seen real public support for this through their secret organizations and person-to-person contacts.

Khadiv: In my response, I will quote Saeed Hajjarian who in response to the call for a referendum to decide the fate of Iran’s nuclear program said that people are on the verge of poverty and dealing with inflation and are half asleep and have no patience for a referendum. Believe me, the situation in Kurdistan is similar to this. To understand this alliance, you have to first explain all the aspects and implications of this development to people. At the same time, you must bear in mind that Iran’s complex and multi-faceted Kurdish society is different from what it was thirty years ago. In the words of Dr Soroosh, Iran’s Kurdistan today is more than the current parties there. This is true  particularly as the middle urban class is rapidly expanding  and the debates of the current parties are not that attractive to it.

Rooz: To what degree does the content of this new agreement reflect the views of Iran’s Kurdish population?

Khadiv: Obviously parts of the agreement are in line with the quests of the Kurdish people. In the ruling circles of Iran too some of these ideas have been discussed. For example, the book by Ghaibaf a few years ago discussed the idea of federalism. But as I have said earlier in the words of Max Weber, there is a difference between an intellectual and a politician. The duty of a political party or a politician is to execute these colorful declarations in the interest of people. The events of Iraqi Kurdistan contain useful lessons in this regard. Federalism has been implemented there but the two main parties continue to  posses thousands of armed militia and by controlling the main economic life lines are moving towards authoritarianism.

Rooz: You criticize this new agreement because you believe it is wrong to model what has happened in Iraqi Kurdistan and think that this agreement will not be joined in by others and expand. But the agreement itself says that interference into each other’s affairs by Kurdish groups is “harmful and misplaced.” Also, national unity in Iran’s Kurdistan is stressed in it.

Khadiv: Please note that when they talk of interference by Kurdish parties they are specifically mean the Kurdish Workers Party and not others such as Etehade Mihani (The Kurdish Patriotic Front) or the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan  (PDKI). This is clear from their earlier statements and declarations. You cannot simply rely on a statement or an announcement and but look at other events and realities. If for example today the Islamic republic announced, as it has in the past, that it will not interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq, would you believe it? Some even say that this very alliance could not have taken place without some support from the PDKI because its relations have recently improved with the Komeleh. This is because the PDKI has grown to be a player in the greater region now and is involved in the events in Syria along with Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other countries such as the US, France etc outside the region. At the same time, its relations with Tehran have deteriorated because of this. On the Syrian issue, the PDKI has mostly relegated the field to the Kurdish Workers Party.

On the issue of the improvement of relations between the Komeleh and the PDKI, this possibly has happened because some of the older members and departees from the KDP who are closer to the Komeleh have established close ties with the PDKI.

Rooz: You said that new divisions may erupt because of the new alliance.

Khadiv: It is difficult to make accurate predictions. But I doubt that Iranian Kurdistan will be simply bi-polar or all united like Turkey. The world is not unipolar or bipolar, like it used to be. One can expect the KDP to play a heavy role compared to other parties in the mid-term.

Rooz: Since you do not believe other models will work in Iranian Kurdistan, what future do you see for Iranian Kurds?

Khadiv: Let me correct your question. I do not believe in mechanical copying of other models and experiences in other countries. The situation in Iranian Kurdistan is more complex than being resolved by mere copying of developments or models in other places. We must really study and understand the peculiarities of Iranian Kurds. For example, this talk in the Internet about Persian-Kurdish differences is not mentioned in the declarations and literature of Iranian Kurds in the past. They talk of “others” but not Persians. And that “other” has been the Ajam, which is a reference to Shiite Iranians and specifically Shiite Turks of Iran. I hope that Iran goes its reforms and I favor a change for the Kurdish people. A change that will include the end of the various kinds of discriminations that exist and move towards political, urban and economic development to improve the lot of the Kurdish people. These require an active civil society. Kurdish groups that have a long history of presence and activity, and have paid heavy losses, should lay down their arms if they want to do a service. This needs to be looked into that while armed struggle has been put aside by the parties for about 20 years, the groups continue with armed training. What is this for? In the words of Mansur Hekmat, what is the use of these few scores of armed men. They cannot disarm even the first village post! Is this not simply a card to pressure political talks of the future. This is when one must be concerned about the future.