Who Opposes Velayat Faghih?
They call me, and others like me, anti-Velayat Faghih (Velayat Faghih in Shiite political terminology means the rule of the cleric, the cleric as the head of state). This is true, but if “melting” in Velayat (a term used by die-hard supporters of clerical rule in Iran) means what President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is showing us, the true followers of Velayat Faghih, which includes the top cleric (i.e. Faghih, ayatollah Khamenei) himself, then we must be revered. Why? Read on.
Right from the day of the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1879, the most important image that the theoreticians of Velayat Faghih have been hard trying to portray to the public is that the top cleric is like the main pole of a tent that constitutes the Islamic state, and not a member of a party, and not a supporter of this or that particular view. He is a father figure who is just and free who is supposed to have a high-level supervision of society. Whenever he sees the government deviating from the main path, he would intervene to arbitrate. He is a cleric who understands the various political forces in the country he wisely supports one group at one time, while supporting another one at a different time. When time comes for difficult decisions, he listens to all sides and makes a decision based on the views of the majority. And like a father, he protects everybody in the family, from the mother to the youngest member. The very thing that Mr. Khomeini did in the family of the “insiders” (insiders, or “khodiha” means those who are trusted and form the inner group of loyalists).
It was understood that the top cleric’s domain was not the battleground between this or that cabinet minister or governor. It was understood that the top cleric (i.e. the Velayat Faghih) would not support one group to the complete detriment of another. He is supposed to be above the battles, and issues his judgment using wisdom, justice, and reason.
During the 16 years of the Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami administrations this image was preserved, even though the events behind the scene were different. Even today, both of them talk of being in love with the top cleric and speak of the top cleric with respect.
But those days have gone. Mahmud Ahmadinejad has brought the top cleric down from his high eminent position. He has been dragged into every dispute. Ahmadinejad brings the word of the Faghih to support a disgraced cabinet minister. Ahmadinejad brings the perspective of the Faghih to win the Majlis support for a billionaire Minister of Interior. He quotes the Faghih to justify cracking down on ordinary citizens who complain about inflation. To suppress students who challenged the crackdown of para-military forces he brings news that the Faghih - and not the president - would come to a gathering of students from Elm va Sanaat University. In other words, if the original Faghih planned to shove a fist in the mouth of the government (a term used by Mr. Khomeini in reference to the Shah’s last government in 1978), the fist of his successor would end up in the mouth of students who have been born in the Islamic Republic, trained by it, went to its universities and carry the “Islamic” adjective in the title of their associations.
These loyal supporters of the executive even justify their school-type letters they write to world leaders and claim them to be approved by the Faghih. So much is attributed to the Faghih by the President and the establishment that one should expect news that the Faghih’s views have been pipelined to all the offices of the government.
With this state of affairs, the true followers of the top cleric should really ask this question: Can a Faghih who is present in the streets, the Majlis, in homes, in government ministries, in moral enforcement offices, in ward 209 of Evin prison, in Keyhan newspaper, in the growing prisons of the country, etc, remain a leader who is supposed to be the pillar of the Islamic Republic? Is the stature of the Faghih the same as that of President Ahmadinejad? Can someone who has been at the helm of affairs for years as a leader have the same standing as someone who is expected to be in charge of executive affairs for a mere 4 or at best 8 years - despite gaining this position through fraud or installing a billionaire General - and who will finally leave office with a good name or merely as Ahmadinejad?
Does Mr. Khamenei and his closest advisors, and all those who have melted in the Faghih, view the position of the leader (i.e. Faghih) of the Islamic Republic today to be that of the “leader of the deprived world” and the deputy of the 12th Shiite Imam (two terms used for the supreme leader of Iran)? Is associating ayatollah Khamenei’s name with a Hezbollah leader, or a party, or a group supporting the government, etc add to the stature of the leader of the Islamic Republic?
Ask yourself: Can the Faghih be stooped to the level of a writer at Keyhan newspaper? Can the Faghih be of the same stature as a prosecutor who has Zahra Kazemi’s (the Canadian-Iranian photojournalist who was killed in Evin prison in 2003) blood on his hands? Can the name of the Faghih be on the letter-head carrying the exile order for the members of the One Million Signature Campaign (a women’s group advocating equality of gender laws in Iran) who have gathered signatures to protect women’s rights? Can students be beaten in the name of the Faghih simply because they are demanding the right to return to their classes? In short, if the key pillar - i.e. the top cleric - is turned into little beams that support small tents that in turn support the main structure of the regime, will the house remain standing? An honest response to this question, if it does not come from the likes of Keyhan newspaper editors or blind-supporters, can throw light on many issues.
You should ask these questions of yourself. And don’t even bother to tell us what the responses are. Because we are, after all, anti-Velayat Faghih and our punishment has already been long decided by the operatives of these very small tents that constitute the Islamic Republic.